Lebanon: Between the Rock and the Hard Place

By Farouk Mawlawi

ccun.org, May 21, 2008
 
 
Several friends and former UN colleagues living in Europe and the Americas, some of whom had served with various UN agencies in Lebanon, expressed in e-mails to me their concern and sadness over last week’s destructive violence and loss of life in Beirut and other parts of the country. They cannot comprehend how leaders of Lebanon’s political parties and factions who had experienced the horrors of the previous civil war can allow their country to go down the path of another one. A valid question indeed – one that calls for a review of the complex issues that divide the Lebanese people into supporters of two major political camps: the Loyalists and the Opposition, with a silent majority in between.
 
The Loyalists are also known as the March Fourteen Forces Coalition, which evolved from the mass rally on that date in 2005 in protest of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri. That rally brought about the withdrawal of Syria’s military forces from the country, and eventually produced for its camp a parliamentary majority in the ensuing elections. This camp is evenly divided between Christian and mostly Sunni Muslim parties, foremost among them is Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (the Future Movement), and the secular, though Druze dominated, Progressive Socialist Party.
 
The opposition, which is also known as the March Eighth Forces Coalition, is dominated by Hizbullah, and includes its junior partner the Amal Movement and the Christian National Liberal Movement headed by General Michel Aoun, who split from the March Fourteen Forces Coalition when his demanded share in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Al-Saniora was not satisfied. Hizbullah and Amal were represented in the government, but their ministers later resigned over the issue of the establishment of the International Tribunal that will try those accused in the assassination of Premier Hariri and a succession of martyrs from the March Fourteen Coalition. Their resignations were not accepted and some of them continued to exercise their office responsibilities on selective basis. Nevertheless, the resignations caused a political crisis that was further exacerbated by the suspension of the parliament by its own speaker, who is also the Head of the Amal Movement, thus paralyzing the legislative process in an attempt to bring down what the Opposition considers an illegitimate and unconstitutional government. Further complications followed the end of former President Emile Lahoud’s term, and the failure to elect a new president over the past six months.
 
Following Israel’s war of aggression on Lebanon in June, 2006 which Israel justified as  retaliation for Hizbullah’s abduction of two of its soldiers, Hizbullah’s weapons and its freedom to undertake military action independent from the government became a controversial issue between the two camps. Though most Lebanese were proud of Hizbullah’s successful humiliation of the Israeli military, they took issue with its belittling of the heavy cost of the war in human casualties and massive destruction. Yet, as long as Hizbullah’s weapons provided a deterrent to Israel’s aggression, the issue remained under control, until the government’s ill-advised decision to dismantle Hizbullah’s telecommunication network, at a time when it lacked the ability to implement such decision. Realizing its dilemma, the government tried to soften the impact of its decisions by delegating to the Lebanese Army the option to shelve those decisions. But Hizbullah insisted that the government should revoke its decisions outright, accusing it of colluding with America and Israel against the Resistance. 
 
Failing this, Hizbullah led a so-called civil disobedience, starting by closing the roads to the airport and seaport and other major arteries in Beirut. Hizbullah’s militias rapidly spread over the streets of west Beirut, indiscriminately shooting at buildings, burning shops and cars and beating innocent civilians. Al-Mustaqbal’s television, radio and newspaper were forced to suspend operations, and the latter’s offices were set on fire. Even the offices of the Hariri Foundation, which financed college education of 35,000 Lebanese youth, were not spared pillaging by the militias, who hardly faced any resistance by the unarmed civilian population. The militias next turned on the Druze mountain villages, strongholds of the Progressive Socialist Party. Unlike in Beirut, they faced fierce resistance in the mountains, before a cease-fire was brokered, allowing the Lebanese army to bring the situation under control.
 
By the time calm returned to the country, 65 people were killed, hundreds more were injured, not to speak of extensive damage to public and private property. Economic losses have yet to be computed, but they undoubtedly run into hundred of millions of dollars. The net result is that neither side came out a winner. If anything, Hizbullah’s military superiority was more than offset by the loss of support among Lebanon’s silent majority. By the end of last week the Arab League had brokered a preliminary agreement that raises hopes for a final settlement. At the time of this writing intensive talks are taking place in Qatar’s capital Doha, whose ruler and prime minister have taken the lead in mediating a solution that would pave the way for electing Army Commander Michel Sulaiman to the presidency, agreement on a national unity government and a new electoral law. The use of Hizbullah’s weapons internally became an urgent issue in the context of reviewing the relationship between the Lebanese government and the Resistance. The Lebanese people cannot endure more wars and fighting any more than they can put up with political crises and economic instability. On their way to the airport Lebanon’s leaders faced hundreds of people carrying signs telling them not to return if they fail to
reach a settlement. It is hoped that the message will be heeded.
 
 Farouk Mawlawi is a former senior official of the Arab League and the United Nations.